

TOP SECRET

30 April 1959

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
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DAILY BRIEF


I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

mo USSR-Iran: The USSR has begun a new phase in its propaganda campaign to undermine the Shah's regime by initiating broadcasts aimed at fomenting unrest among tribal elements. On 27 April, Radio Moscow's first specific references to the anti-Shah Qashqai tribes and to Iranian Kurds appeared in its Persian-language broadcasts. A clandestine station--the "National Voice of Iran"--which is probably Soviet inspired if not actually in the USSR, attacked the Shah's tribal policy in its first broadcasts about 27 April.




OK Poland: A well-planned offensive recently initiated by the Gomulka regime against the Catholic Church is potentially a serious threat to the church's financial position. New tax regulations have been enacted and old ones revived which, if rigorously enforced, would deprive the church of the funds needed to continue most of its social, educational, and charitable activities and force the closing of some religious orders and convents.

mo Watch Committee conclusion--Berlin: No significant changes bearing on the possibility of hostilities.



II. ASIA-AFRICA

mo Pakistan-India: Top Pakistani leaders have recently stated that events in Tibet indicate that India and Pakistan should cooperate militarily in meeting any threat



from the outside. The expression of this view, at a time when India is concerned about the security of its Tibetan border, is probably designed to reduce India's opposition to SEATO and the Baghdad Pact, to facilitate a settlement of the canal waters and Kashmir disputes, (and to strengthen Pakistan's position in requesting a continued flow of US arms aid.) The Indian army chief of staff recently told an American official that now is the time to consider a rapprochement with Pakistan to facilitate joint defense. Considerable progress in resolving outstanding disputes would be necessary, however, before the two countries are ready to engage in joint planning.

Watch Committee conclusion--Middle East: (Situations susceptible of direct exploitation by Sino-Soviet bloc action which would jeopardize US interests exist in the Middle East, particularly in Iraq and Iran. The situation in the area remains precarious, but a deliberate initiation of large-scale hostilities is unlikely in the immediate future.)

m⁰ Iraq: (The Communists are progressively achieving control in Iraq, although for the present they may prefer not to move to take power in their own name.)

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The Philippines: (The coalition agreement between the opposition Liberal and Progressive parties should significantly strengthen their prospects in the November senatorial and provincial elections. The parties may be planning an actual merger, looking to the 1961 general elections, when they would challenge Nacionalista party control of the government.)

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The Netherlands - Indonesia: (Foreign Minister Luns, who is again seeking arms aid for West New Guinea from the United States, says that the Dutch have unobtrusively taken a number of measures to strengthen West New Guinea's defenses. The Indonesian Government, when these measures come to its knowledge, is likely to regard the Dutch actions as a threat to its security and may request more arms aid from the West, the Communist bloc, or both.)

III. THE WEST

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France--Summit tactics: (De Gaulle is likely to insist that his proposal to invite the USSR to join the West in providing aid to underdeveloped countries be on the agenda for any summit conference. He is particularly interested in such a plan for Africa, and has told Secretary Herter that he believes Africa is the area of the Soviet Union's real interest.)

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Moscow Attempts to Foster Tribal Unrest in Iran

Radio Moscow on 27 April gave its first specific support to the Iranian Kurds and the traditionally antiregime Qashqai tribes in Persian-language broadcasts to Iran. About the same date, a new clandestine station--"The National Voice of Iran"--which is probably Soviet inspired if not actually in the USSR, began attacking the Shah's tribal policies.

These broadcasts charged that "the Qashqai tribes and the Iranian Kurds are being deprived of their elementary democratic rights," and that Tehran is trying to place the Kurdish tribal areas of Iran under military control in order to transform them into a base for "destructive activities" against Iraq. Moscow contrasted the "unfortunate lot" of Kurds in Iran with the example in Iraq of Arab-Kurdish cooperation under Qasim. Strong personal attacks on the Shah continue in bloc broadcasts in Persian--currently at a level of about 68 program-hours a week.

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Polish Regime Institutes New Offensive Against Catholic Church

The Polish regime's new offensive against the Catholic Church is potentially the most serious threat to the church since the détente established by the 1956 Church-State Agreement.

The state has issued a stringent reinterpretation of the law exempting from taxation church funds used for religious purposes, virtually eliminating the church's social welfare activities and its construction program.

The regime initially is concentrating its attack on the religious orders which are not under the direct control of Cardinal Wyszynski. Many of them have less contact with the people than the regular parish clergy, and the regime apparently hopes thereby to avoid arousing extensive popular opposition. Action has already been taken against one group of Jesuits who have been accused of large-scale tax evasions and, as a result, had their property confiscated by the state. Some church authorities believe that this action signals the beginning of a general offensive against the Jesuits. Other religious orders and the regular clergy also are being subjected to less drastic financial pressures, which the regime apparently plans to extend.

At the third party congress in March, Gomulka stated that "we do not want a war with the church" but stressed that the church must accept a purely passive role in Polish society. He has long had the aim of strengthening the party's hold over the population at the expense of the church, which is its principal rival. In contrast to tactics used against the church before 1956, the regime is not tampering with matters of faith. The new offensive can seriously decrease church influence and force the population to become dependent upon the party for welfare services previously supplied by the church.

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

High Pakistani Officials Stress Need for Collective Defense
With India

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Pakistani President Ayub, the foreign minister, (the ambas-
sador in Washington, [redacted]
[redacted] and military officers in West Pakistan have all recent-
ly stated [redacted] that Tibetan events indicate
India and Pakistan should join together in defending the subcontinent
in the event of a threat from the outside.

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In spite of their more direct concern with the possibility of
hostilities between India and Pakistan, the military leaders of
both countries have long considered that joint defense of the sub-
continent would be necessary in the event of outside aggression.
Pakistan's military leaders now may feel that the growth of Chi-
nese Communist military power along the Indo-Tibetan border
and the recent deterioration in Sino-Indian relations make the
question of joint defense of more immediate interest. The Pak-
istanis probably believe that emphasizing the concept of collective
defense while India is involved in strengthening the security of its
Tibetan border will reduce India's opposition to SEATO and the
Baghdad Pact. In addition, Karachi may intend by demonstrating
its reasonableness to offset the effects of the recent downing of an
Indian Air Force Canberra by the Pakistani Air Force. Ayub's gov-
ernment desires to create an atmosphere conducive to a settlement
of the canal-waters and Kashmir disputes with India.

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(Karachi probably believes that by playing down its disputes
with India and emphasizing its interest in regional defense, includ-
ing cooperation with India, it will strengthen its position in request-
ing a continued flow of US arms aid.)

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General Thimayya, chief of staff of the Indian Army, [redacted]
[redacted] stated that now is the time to consider a rapprochement with
Pakistan to facilitate joint defense. Considerable progress in set-
tling major disputes will be necessary, however, before the two
countries will be ready to engage in joint defense planning. [redacted]

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Principal Philippine Opposition Parties Agree on Coalition

(The coalition agreement between the Philippine Liberal and Progressive parties poses a significant long-range threat to President Garcia's incumbent Nacionalista party. The text of the parties' communiqué, signed by Vice President Macapagal for the Liberals and Manuel Manahan for the Progressives, provides for a common ticket in the November elections, in which one third of the senate's 24 seats and various provincial governorships and other offices will be contested.)

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
[REDACTED]
(Against these assets, however, must be placed the powerful, well-entrenched political machine of the Nacionalistas and the possibility that discipline within the new grouping may be difficult to maintain. Negotiations for a coalition or merger began as early as 1957 and encountered many stumbling blocks, particularly from the Liberal party's old guard.)

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
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
Netherlands Reports West New Guinea Defenses Strengthened

(Dutch Foreign Minister Luns, in again seeking arms aid for West New Guinea, told United States Ambassador Young in The Hague that the Dutch have unobtrusively taken a number of measures designed to strengthen West New Guinea defenses. He mentioned shipment of new radar equipment, 400 additional marines, increased ground personnel, more ammunition, and "the like.")


(The Dutch, unhappy about US arms aid to Indonesia and the subsequent "chain reaction" of sales by other NATO countries, recently threatened to divert NATO-committed military equipment to West New Guinea if US arms aid is not forthcoming. The Dutch cabinet, impatient with US delay in responding to a "shopping list" of military items submitted to the United States last December, decided in March to improve the Biak airfield for use by jet fighters and to station 100 fully equipped marines at Hollandia. Dutch forces in New Guinea, as of the end of 1958, included 250 to 400 army troops, 1,200 marines, 751 naval personnel, and 175 naval air personnel.)

(The Indonesian Government, on learning of the reinforcements, is likely to seek some means of retaliating, and may also advance the Dutch action as justification for making new requests for arms. Any government failure to react to a Dutch build-up would be exploited by the Indonesian Communist party, now probably the strongest party in Indonesia.)

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